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Abstract 
 
Lobbying is central to the democratic process.  Yet, only four political systems have lobbying 
regulations: the United States, Canada, Germany and the EU (European Parliament).  Despite 
works offering individual country analysis of lobbying legislation, a two-fold void exists in the 
literature.  Firstly, no study has offered a comparative analysis classifying the laws in these four 
political systems, which would improve understanding of the different regulatory environments.  
Secondly, few studies have analysed the views of key agents - politicians, lobbyists and 
regulators - and how these compare and contrast across regulatory environments.  
We firstly utilise an index measuring how strong the regulations are in each of the 
systems, and develop a classification scheme for the different ‘ideal’ types of regulatory 
environment.  Secondly, we measure the opinions of political actors, interest groups and 
regulators in all four systems (through questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what 
correlations, if any, exist between the different ideal types of system and their opinions.  The 
conclusion highlights our findings, and the lessons that can be used by policy-makers in systems 
without lobbying legislation. 
 
 
Introduction and Objectives 
 
Lobbying is a central and legitimate part of the democratic process in all political 
systems.  Although the term has often been associated with negative connotations, the work of 
lobbyists is essential: the provision of input, and feedback, to the political system, thereby helping 
develop policy outputs.  Lobby groups may include those with economic interests (corporations), 
professional interests (trade unions or representatives of a professional society) and civil society 
interests (such as environmental groups).  These groups may seek to influence political decisions 
by many means, including direct communications with governmental officials, presentations, and 
telephone conversations. 
Notwithstanding the importance of lobby/interest groups, only four political systems in 
the world have regulations with regard to lobbying activity: the United States, Canada, Germany 
and the European Union (most particularly, the European Parliament).  ‘Regulations’ refer to 
‘rules’, which interest groups must follow when pursuing lobbying activity including, registering 
with the state before contact can be made with any public official.  It is assumed that regulation of 
 3 
interest group activities offers several advantages to the political system. Some include increased 
accountability and transparency, as well as diminishing loopholes in the system which would 
otherwise allow for corrupt behaviour.  In this regard, schemes to regulate lobbying derive from 
concerns over the democratic deficit, the openness and transparency of government, equality of 
access to public affairs, and the perceived need to manage information flows to and from 
governments.1 
 We turn first to the United States.  In the 1930s Congress enacted legislation in response 
to a number of scandals concerning the lobbying of public utility companies and the maritime 
industry.  However, these regulations were perceived as inadequate.  The Lobbying Act 1946 
(Federal) thus sought ‘to disclose to the legislators and the public the identity of the principals, 
representatives, and the means involved, to make the free play of legislative interest transparent’2.  
In other words, the registration of lobbyists ‘should at least work in the direction of greater 
transparency’3.  However, this Act, hurriedly drafted, contained numerous loopholes.  Since 
publicity was considered important in diminishing bad lobbying practices, critics claimed the 
statute provided inadequate publicity for the activities of pressure groups4.  As Wolpe and 
Levine’s data shows, ‘a 1991 General Accounting Office report found that fewer than 4,000 of 
the 13,500 individuals listed in a directory of Washington lobbyists were registered’5.  It over a 
half a century for the 1946 Act to be replaced by the Lobbying Disclosures Act in 1995, which 
increased the reporting requirements of lobbying organizations.  This law extended the definition 
of lobbyists to include those that lobby directly, as well as those that hire lobbying firms6.  All 
states, except Pennsylvania, have individual lobbying legislation.  Pennsylvania did have 
legislation, the 1998 Lobbying Disclosure Act, but this was struck down in 2000 by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court as it pertains to attorneys, with the court saying the General 
Assembly of Pennsylvania’s efforts to monitor the activities of lobbyists amounted to illegal 
regulations on the practice of law.  This invalidated the law.  In 2002 the Pennsylvanian Supreme 
Court reaffirmed its decision.  
 
In Canada, consensus developed among politicians that legislation requiring the 
registration of lobbyists was necessary to promote transparency and accountability.7  The federal 
level was first to pursue lobbying legislation in 1989 by way of the Lobbyist Registration Act 
(Canada).  The 1989 Act, was amended in 1995 with the Amendment to Lobbyist Registration 
Act, which sought to beef up the information requirements to be forwarded by lobbyists when 
registering.  The final major amendment to the federal Act came with Bill C-15 in 2003 (enforce 
in 2005) that sought to close loopholes in the previous system with regard to definitions of 
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‘lobbying.’  Following from the federal lead, the provinces of Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, 
British Columbia (BC) and most recently Newfoundland enacted lobbying legislation.  
Proponents of Canadian regulations identified two beneficiaries – the public, and government 
officials8  – where the acts have ‘thrown light on the activities of professional lobbyists in 
Canada’.9  Despite this, some critics contend that the legislation is weak compared to US laws.10  
 
The German Bundestag is currently the only parliament in Europe that has adopted 
formal rules on registration of lobbyists, and those wishing to lobby either the Bundestag, or the 
Federal Government, or both, must register on this public list to promote transparency.  In 
principle, lobbyists cannot be heard by parliamentary committees, or be issued with a pass 
admitting them to parliamentary buildings, unless they are on the register.  This system was first 
regulated in the Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag in 1951, through article 73 which referred to 
participation by associations.  It was subsequently amended on two further occasions, in 1975 and 
1980, which indicated an increased use of the hearings system.11  The Bundestag can, however, 
also invite organisations that are not on the register to present information on an ad hoc basis.  
This in essence means that not being on the register is no real barrier to being in contact with 
parliamentary committees or members of the Bundestag.  The Bundestag makes quite clear that 
consulting with interest groups and professional associations is crucial when drafting legislation.  
Article 77, paragraph (1) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany provides for 
legislative bills to be adopted by the Bundestag.  The Bundestag is of the view that many people 
should participate in the substantive elaboration of bills, but responsibility for enacting bills must 
be assumed by those elected for this purpose, hence the nature of invitations to those not on any 
register. 
 
Even though the size of the interest group population in Brussels raises concerns over 
equality of access to, and the ethical standards of, European decision-making,12 the only EU 
institution which has lobbying regulations is the European Parliament.  The debate on lobbying, 
linked to the issue of transparency in EU institutions, began in 1992 with the report of MEP Marc 
Galle, and was followed in 1996 by the report of MEP Glynn Ford.  However, apart from 
minimalist regulations adopted, there was insufficient support for the idea that in exchange for the 
annual renewal of their entry passes, lobbyists should provide detailed reports of their efforts to 
influence the Parliament's decision-making process.  In some contrast to the EP, the Commission 
has continued to favour self-regulation of interests, despite traditionally being the primary target 
of lobbyists in Brussels.13 
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Despite the many works that have offered individual country analysis of development of 
lobbying legislation, there is a two-fold void in the literature.  First, no study has offered a 
comparative analysis that classifies the types of laws in these four political systems.  This will 
allow for better understanding of the different regulatory environments one finds in this issue 
area.  Secondly, few studies have analysed what are the views of key agents involved in the 
process, including politicians, lobbyists and regulators, and how these compare and contrast 
across different regulatory environments. 
The objective of this paper is two-fold.  First, we will use a quantitative index to measure 
how strong or weak the regulations are in each system, allowing us to devise a classification 
scheme of the different ‘ideal’ types of regulatory environments.  We will argue that the three 
ideal types are lowly, medium, and strongly regulated systems.  Secondly, we will measure the 
opinion of political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems (as measured through 
questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what correlations, if any, one can draw between the 
different ideal types of systems and their opinions.  We will argue that actors in highly regulated 
systems claim to know more about legislation, are more likely to argue that accountability is 
ensured, and feel that there are fewer loopholes in the system that those respondents from lower 
regulated systems.  Nevertheless, even in relatively highly regulated systems, the regulations can 
be undermined under the ‘if there is a will there is always a way’ principle. 
 
 
Rating Regulation – Regulatory Environment Ideal Types 
 
There are two measures of the rigour with which the US regulates lobbying.  The first is 
Opheim’s rating of the stringency of lobbying regulation in 47 states.14  Opheim’s index consists 
of 22 separately scored items drawn from three different dimensions of lobbying regulation 
requirements.  The dimensions were: (1) statutory definitions of a lobbyist (seven items); (2) 
frequency and quality of disclosure (eight items); and (3) oversight and enforcement of 
regulations (seven items).  The values of the index range from a low of 0 for Arkansas to a high 
of 18 for New Jersey, Washington, and Wisconsin.  The second measure is Brinig et al.’s, rating 
of the restrictiveness of state lobbying laws.15  Rather than offer explicit coding schemes, their 
work highlights specific examples.  They consider the frequency with which lobbyists are 
required to register and report, and their scheme emphasises the severity of penalties for 
violations of lobbying laws.  The values of the index range from a low of 1 for Arkansas to a high 
of 14 for Alabama and Kentucky. 
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An extension of this method of analysis has been pursued by the Centre for Public 
Integrity (CPI), which has analyzed lobbying legislation in the 50 US jurisdictions with such (the 
federal level and 49 states that have legislation) and measured the legislations’ effectiveness.  The 
detailed process of analysis is referred to as the ‘Hired Guns’ method, which results in a ‘CPI 
Scores.’  The CPI writes 
‘Hired Guns’ is an analysis of lobby disclosure laws in all 50 states.  The 
Center for Public Integrity created a ranking system that assigns a score to 
each state (with lobbying legislation) based on a survey containing a series of 
questions regarding state lobby disclosure.  The questions addressed eight key 
areas of disclosure for state lobbyists and the organizations that put them to 
work:  
• Definition of Lobbyist  
• Individual Registration  
• Individual Spending Disclosure  
• Employer Spending Disclosure  
• Electronic Filing  
• Public Access (to a registry of lobbyists) 
• Enforcement and  
• Revolving Door Provisions (with a particular focus on ‘cooling off 
periods’) 
 
Example 1 (Appendix A) – which offers an example of the CPI’s examination of Washington 
State– shows how the CPI extends on Opheim’s model by considering 48 questions in its 8 
sections. 
In fact, the CPI’s index goes well beyond the extent of Opheim’s work by looking at individual 
lobbyist registration, electronic filing, public access, and revolving door provisions.  On one 
level, this broader examination of lobbying regulations is a natural product of time, and 
technological development.  Electronic filing of returns by lobbyists, and public internet access to 
detailed databases of lobbyists, was far in the future in 1991.  But, on another level, the CPI’s 
framework is more thorough than Opheim’s, in that it examines the issues of individual lobbying 
registration, public access to a directory of lobbyists, and the revolving door provisions, which 
Opheim bypassed.  Thus, in expanding upon the range of lobbying regulations studied by 
Opheim, and setting out 48 separately scored items, as opposed to Opheim’s 22, the CPI’s 
framework constitutes a broader, and deeper, approach to analysing the rigour with which states 
regulate lobbies. 
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 That the CPI’s framework was designed for examining lobbying regulations in the US 
should not render it inapplicable to other jurisdictions.  As the framework is capable of taking 
account of the widely varying standards of lobbying regulation across all 50 American states, and 
at the federal level, it should also be capable of taking account of lobbying regulations in other 
countries.  The very thoroughness of the framework makes it analytically encompassing. 
Based on analysis of the legislation, each question is assigned a numerical (i.e. point) 
value according to the answer given.  The more points that are given, the ‘better’ the legislation in 
terms of promoting concepts such as full disclosure, public access, and transparency.  The 
maximum score a jurisdiction could attain is 100 points, the minimum 1 point (a score of zero 
would be given to a state with no lobbying legislation).  According to the CPI, if a jurisdiction 
attains a score of 60 points, or more, it is deemed to ‘pass’, based on the grading system used in 
American schools.  Regardless of the somewhat arbitrary rule of what constitutes a ‘passing 
grade’, as a general rule one can argue that the lower the CPI score, the less robust the lobbying 
regulations in place.    
To gain comparative insights, we transfer the CPI method to analysing lobbying 
legislation in Canada, Germany and the European Parliament.  As an objective here is to offer a 
comparative analysis of the lobbying legislation in place in four political systems, it was felt that, 
given its robustness and detailed method of analysis, application of the CPI methodology would 
allow for greater insights with regard to how the different countries studied compared and 
contrasted to each other, and how this could be theoretically classified.  For illustrative purposes, 
Example 1 (Appendix A) also shows how the CPI scores for Canadian federal lobbying 
legislation, and German lobbying legislation, were calculated by this research team.  As in the 
previous example of Washington State, point values are assigned to each of the 48 questions.  
With the above in mind, we applied the CPI method of analysis to all other jurisdictions 
where lobbying legislation exists, including the state and provincial levels in the US and Canada 
respectively.  Because all Länder level legislation is similar to the German federal legislation, 
only the German Federal level is reported.  Table 1 summarises our findings, illustrating the CPI 
scores for each of the jurisdictions in descending order.  The scores for the US are taken from the 
CPI website, whereas all other scores were calculated by the research team.  
 
    
    (Table 1 about here) 
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Based on analysis of the table, at least three observations can be made.  First 50 per cent of the 
US observations have scores of 60 points or more, where the American federal legislation has a 
score below most states.  Second, all Canadian observations have scores that hover between 35 
and 50 points.  Finally, the lowest jurisdictions are Germany and the European Parliament.  
 
With Table 1 in mind, and given that it is useful to gain a theoretical understanding of the 
different sorts of regulatory systems, one can consider developing a theoretical classification of 
the different types of lobbying regulatory environments.  Clearly, any classification scheme will 
be debated and challenged.  But, using classification schemes, and developing what Max Weber 
referred to as ‘ideal types’, where the ideal type is formed from characteristics and elements of 
the given phenomenon but is not meant to correspond to all of the characteristics of any one 
particular case, forms the basis for helping us understand common trends as well as differences.   
We argue that there are three ‘ideal types’ of regulatory systems relative to each other: lowly 
regulated systems, medium regulated systems, and highly regulated systems.  
 
The first, relatively lowly regulated systems correspond to jurisdictions that attained CPI 
scores between 1 and 19, and refers to Germany and the European Parliament.  Such systems 
entail the following qualitative characteristics.  They have rules on individual registration, where 
lobbyist must register, but few details have to be given (such as in the case of the EP where 
lobbyists do not have to state which subject matter/bill/institution they are lobbying).  There are 
no rules on individual spending disclosure (lobbyists are not required to file spending reports) or 
an employer spending disclosure (lobbyists’ employers are not required to file spending reports).  
There is a weak system of on-line registration.  Lobbyists’ lists are available to the public, but not 
all details are displayed.  Finally, there are little enforcement capabilities, and no cooling-off 
period in the legislation, which means legislators can register as lobbyists immediately after 
leaving office. 
 
The second type, medium regulated systems correspond to those jurisdictions that 
attained a CPI score between 20 and 59, and include all the Canadian jurisdictions plus several 
American ones, including the federal level.  In these systems the rules on individual registration 
are tighter than in ‘Lowly Regulated Systems’.  For instance, those registering must state the 
subject matter/bill/governmental institution being lobbied.  Regulations exist surrounding 
individual spending disclosures, whereby gifts are prohibited, and all political contributions must 
be reported.  Yet, there are loopholes, such as free ‘consultancy’ by lobbyists to political parties.  
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There are no regulations for employer spending reports, so a lobbyist’s employer is not required 
to file a spending report.  There is a system of on-line registration, which in some cases, such as 
Ontario, is efficient and effective, requiring few resources to use and maintain.  Public access to a 
lobbying register is available and updated at frequent intervals, although spending disclosures are 
not publicised.  In theory, a state agency can conduct mandatory reviews and audits, although it is 
unlikely the agency will prosecute violations of regulations given its lack of resources and 
information.  There is only one case of a prosecution in the whole of Canada, that was in Quebec 
in 2006.  Finally, there is a cooling off period before legislators, having left office, can register as 
lobbyists. 
 
The final type, relatively highly regulated systems entail jurisdictions, which attained a CPI score 
of over 60 and under 100. This corresponds exclusively to 50 per cent of the American States, 
with the highest being Washington State. The rules on individual registration in these systems are 
the tightest of the three.  For example, not only is the subject matter/institution required when 
registering, but also the lobbyist must state the name of all employers, notify almost immediately 
any changes in the registration, and provide a photograph. Tight individual spending disclosures 
are required, in stark contrast to both lowly and medium regulated systems. In this context a 
lobbyist must file a spending report, his/her salary must be reported, all spending must be 
accounted for and itemised, all people on whom money was spent must be identified, and all 
campaign spending must be accounted for.  Employer spending disclosure is also tight.  Unlike 
‘lowly regulated’ or ‘medium regulated’ systems, an employer of a lobbyist is required to file a 
spending report and all salaries must be reported.  A system for on-line registration exists, and 
public access to a lobbying registry is available, which is updated frequently.  This includes 
spending disclosures, which are available to the public, a provision not found in the other two 
systems.  State agencies conduct mandatory reviews and audits, and there is a statutory penalty 
for late and incomplete filing of a lobbying registration form.  Finally, there is a cooling off 
period before legislators, having left office, can register as lobbyists. 
 
    (Table 2 about here) 
 
Actors’ Opinions; and Correlations with Ideal Types 
 
To understand how effective the legislation has been questionnaires were sent to lobby 
groups, politicians, and public sector administrators in the federal and provincial jurisdictions 
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with lobbying legislation in Canada, including Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, and British 
Columbia; the federal level and a representative sample of states in the US, including 
Washington, New York, California, Texas, Georgia, Colorado, Florida, Illinois; and actors 
working at both the federal German level and the EP.  As Newfoundland only implemented 
legislation in late 2005, no surveys were sent there.  The total number of questionnaires sent 
between October and December 2005 was 1808, of which 1225 were dispatched to lobbyists, 91 
to public sector administrators, and 492 to politicians.  Given that questionnaires sent by email 
generally yield a low response rate, hardcopies sent by post was the approach adopted here.  
Taking all four political systems, a total of 140 questionnaires were completed: 6.5 per cent of all 
lobbyists, 19.8 per cent of all public sector administrators, and 8.7 per cent of all politicians 
responded.  Several respondents replied that although interested in the study, they were unable to, 
or did not want to, fill in the questionnaire.  This can partly explain why response rates were not 
higher, especially for politicians.  It reflects the fact that some felt the subject matter sensitive and 
did not want to state their positions (despite the guarantee of anonymity).  Another factor 
impinging upon our response rate was that several respondents had moved, changed address, 
changed portfolios or, in the case of politicians, retired.  When completing the questionnaire, 
respondents were also asked if they would be willing to partake in a follow up interview.  As 
such, we held over 25 on-site interviews in Canada and the US, and several telephone interviews 
with officials in Brussels and Germany, between March and April 2006.  Taking both the 
questionnaires and elite interviews, we consider the respondents’ answers to the various 
questions, while attempting to see if there are correlations between the overall responses to 
questions and the ideal type of system respondents come from.  We recognise that, when 
compared to large N studies, the numbers of respondents is relatively small, but, it was 
our intention to gain an indication of trends and relations, not to conduct a ‘large N’ study 
per se.  
 
One of the first questions asked if respondents considered themselves knowledgeable on 
the relevant legislation pertaining to regulation of lobbyists.  Approximately 85 per cent of 
elected representatives and public sector administrators considered themselves knowledgeable.  
77 per cent of lobbyists saw themselves as knowledgeable, with the only outlier being Germany 
where almost half were neutral on the issue, and slightly more than 50 per cent did not consider 
themselves knowledgeable.  To ascertain if there are correlations between answers to this 
question and our classification of ‘ideal types’ of systems discussed above (lowly, medium and 
highly regulated) we first compressed all the responses from the question into the three 
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categories, defined by CPI ranges of 0-19, 20-59, and 60-100.  Then we carried out cross-
tabulations:  Pearson chi-square tests the hypothesis that the CPI ranges and the answers to the 
questions are independent.  The lower the significance value for a correlation the less likely it is 
that the two variables are independent.  In other words, the lower the score the more likely they 
are related.  With this test a value of less than 0.05 is considered significant.  When the cross-
tabulations were completed, a correlation was found: actors in higher regulated systems are more 
likely to strongly agree with the idea that they are more knowledgeable about the legislation.  
This makes intuitive sense because if an actor is in an environment where there are more robust 
‘rules,’ the more likely they will feel responsible to learn what these are.  The opposite is also true 
as reflected in the responses from lobbyists in Germany: the less robust the regulations, then the 
less likely respondents would feel responsibility to learn about the rules as their impact is 
minimal in any case.   
 
Another question we sought to measure was whether respondents felt the overall regulations 
in their jurisdiction help ensure accountability in government.  Over 76 per cent of elected 
representative felt lobbying legislation helped ensure accountability, while this figure dropped to 
71 per cent for lobbyists.  Nevertheless, only 50 per cent of public sector administrators felt 
lobbying regulations ensured accountability.  Regulators at the Canadian federal level represented 
an outlier, with none considering lobbying regulations as helping ensure accountability.  When 
performing the cross-tabulations a correlation was found: actors in higher regulated systems were 
more likely to argue that the system ensures accountability.  Again, this does make intuitive sense 
given that tighter regulatory systems promote accountability precisely because the rules are 
stronger.  On the other hand, the weaker the regulations the more likely they will have less effect 
in promoting accountability. 
 
Another question sought to measure whether respondents felt having public access to an 
official list of lobbyists ensures accountability.  The following answers were given across all four 
countries: almost 70 per cent of elected representatives, and 80 per cent of administrators, 
considered public access to an official list of lobbyists ensured accountability.  However, only 60 
per cent of lobbyists regarded public access to an official list of lobbyists as ensuring 
accountability.  There was a correlation here: respondents in higher regulated systems were more 
likely to strongly agree that having an official list of lobbyists ensures accountability than those in 
lower regulated systems.  When cross tabulations were run on whether there was a correlation 
between CPI scores and if public access to an official list of lobbyists was freely available, a 
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correlation was found: higher regulated systems guarantee public access and knowledge of who is 
lobbying the government.  This indicates that higher regulated systems foster transparency.  
Taking both observations together, one interpretation is that higher regulated systems are more 
likely to have safeguards that ensure a list of lobbyists is in place at all times, and is readily 
accessible to the public via the internet.  
 
When asked if reviews or audits of lobbyists by agencies are effective in ensuring 
accountability, almost 38 per cent of elected representative were neutral on this question, while 
only 43 per cent regarded reviews or audits of lobbyists as effective in ensuring accountability.  
Over 58 per cent of public sector administrators were neutral.  Only about 40 per cent of lobby 
groups agreed that reviews or audits of lobbyists by agencies are effective in ensuring 
accountability.  Lobbyists were more inclined than the other two groups towards neutrality or 
disagree.  Unlike the previous questions on accountability, there was no correlation: suggesting 
no relationship between the type of regulations in place and whether or not reviews or audits 
ensure accountability. 
 
Beyond the above finding showing that higher regulatory systems promote transparency 
in the political process through ensuring public lists of lobbying groups are freely available, 
another question sought to measure whether specific rules surrounding individual spending 
disclosures help ensure transparency.  Over 93 per cent of elected representative agreed, or 
strongly agreed, that specific rules surrounding individual spending disclosures help ensure 
transparency, while this number dropped to 65 per cent and 75 percent for administrators and 
lobbyists respectively.  No correlation was found between CPI scores and transparency with 
regard to individual disclosures: mostly all respondents believed that individual spending 
disclosures promoted transparency.  However, of all systems, only highly regulated ones have the 
strongest rules surrounding individual and employer spending disclosers, such as whether a 
lobbyist is required to file a spending report, if salaries are to be reported by lobbyists on 
spending reports, and whether the recipient of the expenditure is required to be identified.  While 
this finding suggests respondents from highly regulated systems are satisfied with regulations 
surrounding individual spending disclosures, the survey finding suggest one of two things for 
those respondents from lowly, and medium, regulated systems.  Either they would not 
unreasonably want to see more rules surrounding individual spending disclosures forming part of 
their legislation, or they like the idea ‘in theory,’ but do not want to see it form a full part of their 
legislation.  
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An interesting finding relates to loopholes.  We initially asked respondents whether they 
thought there are loopholes in the system that would allow individual lobbyists to give/receive 
‘gifts’, regardless of the legislation in force.  In Germany and the EP, 35 per cent of elected 
representatives agreed there are loopholes in the system permitting lobbyists to give/receive 
‘gifts.’  However, in American jurisdictions such as New York and California, the opposite is the 
case.  Public sector administrators tended to be more neutral or disagreed with this question (78 
per cent).  Only at the federal level in Canada do administrators believe there are loopholes.  In 
jurisdictions such as Germany, 58 per cent of lobbyists held there are loopholes, while the 
remainder were neutral.  In New York and California, lobbyists are much less likely to agree with 
the view there are loopholes.  A correlation found that the more lowly regulated the system, the 
more likely it was perceived to have loopholes.  This again makes some intuitive sense: if there 
are tighter rules, it is less likely that you will find a ‘loophole’.  However, it is important to note 
that several of the interviewees mentioned the idea that, ‘regardless of the legislation in force, 
there are always ways of getting around it,’ even in highly regulated systems; or, as a Canadian 
interviewee put it ‘where there’s a will, there’s a way!’  Even in Washington State, the highest 
regulated jurisdiction in the study, a CPI report in August 2005 found that the spirit of the state’s 
exemplary disclosure law was being undermined by lobbyists who report their clients’ purposes 
on disclosure forms in vague terms.  This view was reiterated by both lobbyists and regulators in 
interviews in Olympia, Washington State, in March 2006.  A senior official of the Public 
Disclosure Commission (PDC), in Washington State remarked that while the vast majority of 
lobbyists, and those they lobby on behalf of, were happy to obey the rules, there were always a 
few who would try to flout them.  If we take the case of Canada, legislation exists specifying that 
only $1,000 can be given to any political party during a campaign.  Ways of ‘getting around this’ 
include: free consultancy work by lobbyists for a political party during an election with the view 
of attaining pay-offs if the party gets elected; or helping ‘fund-raise’ for a party by holding 
special private events (such as a fund-raising supper). 
 
The problems of loopholes relates to the other problem of enforcement.  Although there 
is little enforcement capabilities in lowly regulated systems, most legislation in highly and 
medium regulated systems encompasses a system of fines if, for example, a lobbyist has not 
registered.  But, how effective are registrars in enforcing that lobbyists register in medium and 
highly regulated systems?  When asked if they thought there are lobby groups working that have 
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not registered Canadian regulators answer ‘probably.’  But, the following response by an 
interviewee in Canada illustrates the effectiveness of enforcement: 
 
 
Some lobby groups are not registered because they are ignorant of the rules. 
Others, such as some lawyers, don’t realise that they are lobbyists.  If I receive 
a complaint from a third party, I investigate it… but I have usually found that 
‘human error’ is the reason for not having registering…. (there is no 
maliciousness).  Registering helps increase the credibility and trust that 
citizens have in lobby groups and politicians alike. 
 
A similar point was made in Washington State, where the PDC observed that much of the 
problem in relation to non registration was human error and not malicious.  Those that were 
malicious were quickly discovered and punished, as the registration system has gained 
widespread credibility, and those who hire lobbyists demand they are registered.  Interestingly, 
many lobby groups register not only because it is required in certain jurisdictions, but also 
because it is good ‘public relations’, and in their ‘self-interest’.  As several lobbyists in medium 
and highly regulated systems mentioned, with the registration system they could illustrate to their 
members what their lobbying activities were at the local government level.  Some lobbyists said 
they registered to show other lobbyists and consultants what ‘they were doing,’ or ‘showing how 
successful they are in terms of the work that is being done.’  From this perspective, enforcement 
is not a problem as lobby groups strategically use the registry to legitimate what they are doing, 
and to get the ‘message across’ to citizens and competitors alike.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Despite the existing literature on lobbying, no study has offered a comparative analysis of 
developments in the four systems where lobbying legislations exists.  Nor has there been a 
comparative study seeking to better understand politicians’, lobbyists’ and regulators’ views of 
the regulations, and how these vary according to the specific regulatory environment.  With this 
in mind, the paper’s first objective was employ a quantitative index to measure the strength of 
regulations in each of the four systems, which would allow for a classification scheme of the 
‘ideal’ types of regulatory environments.  The second objective was to gauge the opinion of 
political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems, and measure what correlations, 
if any, can be drawn between the different ideal types of systems and their opinions. 
 
 15 
The first significant finding is that three ideal types of regulatory environment can be 
conceptualised with respect to lobbying regulations, and that there is not simply one model per 
se.  The first are lowly regulated systems, and the main conclusion drawn from them are that rules 
on individual lobbyists registration exist, but few details beyond this are required.  Moreover, 
while lobbying lists are available for public scrutiny, details such as spending reports are not.  
The political systems that fit within this ideal type are Germany and the European Union.  By 
contrast, the main findings from medium regulated systems are that lobbyists must not only 
register, but must also state the institutional actors they are lobbying, and the subject matter they 
are lobbying on.  Some regulations exist surrounding individual spending disclosures, gifts are 
prohibited, and all political contributions must be reported.  But, there are no regulations for 
employers’ spending reports, and lobbyist spending disclosures are not available for public 
scrutiny.  The systems within this ideal type include the federal levels in Canada and the United 
States, all Canadian provinces, and several US states.  In strongly regulated systems lobbyists 
must reveal their employers, the institutional actors they are lobbying, and the subject matter they 
are lobbying upon.  Rigorous individual spending disclosures are required of both lobbyists, and 
their employers.  Scrutiny of spending disclosures is open to the public, and regulatory 
transgressions are punishable by means of significant penalties.  Fitting within this ideal type are 
half the American states.  
 
The second significant finding relates to the opinions of agents involved in lobbying, 
including politicians, regulators and interest groups.  Actors in highly regulated systems were 
more likely to agree, compared to actors in lowly regulated systems, that regulations help ensure 
accountability in government.  In other words, the stronger the rules the more accountability is 
fostered in the political system.  It was also found that actors in higher regulated systems are more 
likely to strongly agree that they are knowledgeable about legislation.  In this scenario, the tighter 
the rules, the greater the responsibility actors feel to study them.  Another finding was that the 
weaker the regulatory environment, the more lightly respondents were to think there were 
loopholes.  Nevertheless, it was argued that even in relatively highly regulated systems, if there is 
a ‘will’ there is always a ‘way’ of undermining the regulations.  From this perspective, while 
highly regulated systems help ensure fewer loopholes, no ideal type is infallible. 
 
While this study has been concerned with understanding lobbying regulations in four 
systems, the findings may offer two primary insights for states such as the UK and Ireland that 
have considered regulating lobbying activity, but have yet to adopt such rules.  The first is that 
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there are different ways to regulate lobbyists.  For example, the lowly regulated ideal system 
suggests that there is ‘light’ way of regulating, while the highly regulated system suggests there is 
‘heavy’ way of so doing.  Depending on what the objectives of the regulation are, states may 
implement different ideal types.  The second insight is that adoption of different ideal types will 
have different impacts.  For example, if a highly regulated ideal type is implemented, this seems 
to foster accountability in the political system as well as promote safeguards against different 
loopholes.  Nevertheless, with regard to the latter point, this study has shown that lobbying 
legislation is no panacea: if lobbyists and politicians desire to pursue corrupt activities, no piece 
of legislation will prevent them from so doing.  Yet, it may be argued that pursuit of lobbying 
rules may serve as framework to establish a paradigm within which all policy-makers can 
effectively function.  This paradigm ultimately promotes the long term goals of accountability 
and transparency while it potentially serves as a deterrent, if not an antidote, for corrupt practices.  
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Appendix A 
 
Example 1: CPI Score for Washington State (calculated by the Centre for Public 
Integrity); Canada Federal; and Germany.  
 
  
Question 
 
 
Washington  
State Answers 
 
Point 
Value 
  
Canada 
Federal 
Answers 
Point 
Value 
 
Germany 
Answers 
Point 
Value 
 
Definition of Lobbyist      
1 In addition to legislative lobbyists, 
does the definiton recognize executive 
branch lobbyists? 
Yes 3 Yes 3 No 0 
2 How much does an individual have to 
make/spend to qualify as a lobbyist or 
to prompt registration as a lobbyist, 
according to the definition? 
Must register 
irrespective of 
how much 
made/spent 
4 Must register 
irrespective of 
much money 
made/spent 
4 Must register 
irrespective 
how much 
money 
made/spent 
4 
Individual Registration      
3 Is a lobbyist required to file a 
registration form? 
Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 
4 How many days can lobbying take 
place before registration is required? 
0 days 4 1 to 10 days 2 16 or more 
days 
0 
5 Is subject matter or bill number to be 
addressed by a lobbyist required on 
registration forms? 
Subject matter 
only required 
1 Bill number 
subject matter 
3 Subject Matter 1 
6 How often is registration by a 
lobbyist required? 
Every other 
year 
1 Every six 
months 
2 Every year 2 
7 Within how many days must a 
lobbyist notify the oversight agency of 
changes in registration? 
6 to 10 days 2 16 or more 
days 
0 16 or more 
days 
0 
8 Is a lobbyist required to submit a 
photograph with registration? 
Yes 1 No 0 No 0 
9 Is a lobbyist required to identify by 
name each of employer on the 
registration form? 
Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 
10 Is a lobbyist required to clearly 
identify on the registration form any 
additional information about the type 
of their lobbying work (ie, 
compensated or non-
compensated/contract or salaried)? 
Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 
Individual Spending Disclosure      
11 Is a lobbyist required to file a 
spending report? 
Yes 3 No 0 No 0 
12 How often during each two-year cycle 
is a lobbyist required to report 
spending? 
10 or more 
filings within 
two years 
3 No 0 N/A 0 
13 Is compensation/salary required to be 
reported by a lobbyist on spending 
reports? 
Yes 2 No 0 No  0 
14 Are summaries (totals) of spending 
classified by category types (ie, gifts, 
entertainment, postage, etc.)? 
Yes 2 No 0 No 0 
15 What spending must be itemized? All spending 
required to be 
itemized 
4 No 0 N/A 0 
16 Is the lobbyist employer/principal on Yes 1 No 0 N/A 0 
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whose behalf the itemized expenditure 
was made required to be identified? 
17 Is the recipient of the itemized 
expenditure required to be identified? 
Yes 1 No 0 No 0 
18 Is the date of the itemized expenditure 
required to be reported? 
Yes 1 No 0 No 0 
19 Is a description of the itemized 
expenditure required to be reported? 
Yes 1 No 0 No 0 
20 Is subject matter or bill number to be 
addressed by a lobbyist required on 
spending reports? 
Subject matter 
only required 
1 Bill number 
required 
3 No 0 
21 Is spending on household members of 
public officials by a lobbyist required 
to be reported? 
Yes 1 No 0 No 0 
22 Is a lobbyist required to disclose 
direct business associations with 
public officials, candidates or 
members of their households? 
No 0 No 0 No 0 
23 What is the statutory provision for a 
lobbyist giving/reporting gifts? 
Gifts are 
limited and 
reported 
2 Gifts 
prohibited 
3 None 0 
24 What is the statutory provision for a 
lobbyist giving/reporting campaign 
contributions? 
Contribute 
allowed; 
disclosed on 
spending 
report/ 
prohibited 
during session 
1 all political 
contribution 
reported by 
recipient 
1 None 0 
25 Is a lobbyist who has done no 
spending during a filing period 
required to make a report of no 
activity? 
Yes 1 No 0 No 0 
Employer Spending Disclosure      
26 Is an employer/principal of a lobbyist 
required to file a spending report? 
Yes 3 No 0 No 0 
27 Is compensation/salary required to be 
reported on employer/principal 
spending reports? 
Yes 2 No 0 No 0 
Electronic Filing      
28 Does the oversight agency provide 
lobbyists/employers with 
electronic/online registration? 
Yes 1 Yes 1 No  0 
29 Does the oversight agency provide 
lobbyists/employers with 
electronic/online spending reporting? 
Yes 1 Yes 1 No 0 
30 Does the oversight agency provide 
training about how to file 
registrations/spending reports 
electronically? 
Yes 1 Yes 1 No 0 
Public Access      
31 Location/format of registration or 
active lobbyist directory: 
Searchable 
database on 
the Web 
3 Searchable 
database on 
the Web 
4 Yes 3 
32 Location/format of spending reports: Searchable 
database on 
the Web 
3 No 0 No 0 
33 Cost of copies: Less than 25 
cents per page 
1 $1 per page 0 0 1 
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34 Are sample registration 
forms/spending reports available the 
Web? 
Yes 1 No 0 No 0 
35 Does the state agency provide an 
overall lobbying spending total by 
year? 
Yes 2 No 0 No 0 
36 Does the state agency provide an 
overall lobbying spending total by 
spending report deadlines? 
Yes 2 No 0 No 0 
37 Does the state agency provide an 
overall lobbying spending total by 
industries lobbyists represent? 
Yes 2 No 0 No 0 
38 How often are lobby lists updated? Daily 4 Daily 4 Annually  1 
Enforcement      
39 Does the state have statutory auditing 
authority? 
Yes 2 Yes 2 No 0 
40 Does the state agency conduct 
mandatory reviews or audits? 
Yes 2 Yes 2 No 0 
41 Is there a statutory penalty for late 
filing of lobby registration form? 
Yes 1 Yes 1 No 0 
42 Is there a statutory penalty for late 
filing of lobby spending report? 
Yes 1 No 0 No 0 
43 When was a penalty for late filing of 
a lobby spending report last levied? 
Within 0 to 1 
year 
3 N/A 0 N/A 0 
44 Is there a statutory penalty for 
incomplete filing of a lobby 
registration form? 
Yes 1 Yes 1 N/A 0 
45 Is there a statutory penalty for 
incomplete filing of a lobby spending 
report? 
Yes 1 N/A 0 No 0 
46 When was a penalty for incomplete 
filing of a lobby spending report last 
levied? 
Within 0 to 1 
year/don't 
accept 
incomplete 
filings 
3 N/A 0 N/A 0 
47 Does the state publish a list of 
delinquent filers either on the Web or 
in a printed document? 
No 0 No 0 No 0 
Revolving Door Provision      
48 Is there a “cooling off” period 
required before legislators can 
register as lobbyists? 
Yes 2 Yes 2 N/A 0 
 Total Number of Points  87  45  17 
 
Sources: http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/nationwide.aspx?st=WA&Display=DrStateNumbers; 
authors’ analysis of Canadian Federal and German legislation. 
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Table 1: CPI Scores for USA, Canada, Germany and the EP  
STATE CPI SCORE STATE CPI SCORE 
Washington 87 Montana 56 
Kentucky 79 Delaware 56 
Connecticut 75 Arkansas 56 
South Carolina 75 Louisiana 55 
New York 74 Florida 55 
Massachusetts 73 Oregon 55 
Wisconsin 73 Vermont 54 
California 71 Hawaii 54 
Utah 70 Idaho 53 
Maryland 68 Nevada 53 
Ohio 67 Alabama 52 
Indiana 66 West Virginia 52 
Texas 66 Newfoundland 48 
New Jersey 65 Iowa 47 
Mississippi 65 Oklahoma 47 
Alaska 64 North Dakota 46 
Virginia 64 Canada Federal 45 
Kansas 63 Illinois 45 
Georgia 63 Tennessee 45 
Minnesota 62 South Dakota 42 
Missouri 61 British Columbia 44 
Michigan 61 Ontario  43 
Nebraska 61 Quebec  40 
Arizona 61 New Hampshire 36 
Colorado 60 America Federal 36 
Maine 59 Nova Scotia  36 
North Carolina 58 Wyoming 34 
New Mexico 58 Germany 17 
Rhode Island 58 EU Parliament  15 
 
Key 
 
 
 
 
America (Those in red represent jurisdictions where surveys were sent as discussed 
later; other states whose CPI scores are only reported are in black) 
 
 
 
Canada 
 
 
 
European Parliament 
 
 
 
Germany 
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Table 2: The Three Ideal Types of Regulatory Systems   
 Lowly Regulated 
Systems 
Medium Regulated 
Systems 
Highly Regulated 
Systems 
Registration 
regulations 
Rules on individual 
registration, but few 
details required 
Rules on individual 
registration, more details 
required 
Rules on individual 
registration are extremely 
rigorous 
Spending 
disclosure 
No rules on individual 
spending disclosure, or 
employer spending 
disclosure 
Some regulations on 
individual spending 
disclosure; none on 
employer spending 
disclosure 
Tight regulations on 
individual spending 
disclosure, and employer 
spending disclosure 
Electronic 
filing 
Weak on-line registration 
and paperwork required 
Robust system for on-
line registration, no 
paperwork necessary 
Robust system for on-
line registration, no 
paperwork necessary 
Public access List of lobbyists 
available, but not 
detailed, or updated 
frequently 
List of lobbyists 
available, detailed, and 
updated frequently 
List of lobbyists and their 
spending disclosures 
available, detailed, and 
updated frequently 
Enforcement Little enforcement 
capabilities invested in 
state agency 
In theory state agency 
possesses enforcement 
capabilities, though 
infrequently used 
State agency can, and 
does, conduct mandatory 
reviews /audits  
Revolving 
door 
provision 
No cooling off period 
before former legislators 
can register as lobbyists 
There is a cooling off 
period before former 
legislators can register as 
lobbyists 
There is a cooling off 
period before former 
legislators can register as 
lobbyists 
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